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Abstract
A connectionist model of the balance scale task is presented which exhibits 
developmental transitions between ‘Rule I’ and ‘Rule II’ behavior (Siegler, 1976) as well 
as the ‘catastrophe flags’ seen in data from Jansen & van der Maas (2001). The model 
extends the McClelland (1989, 1995) model of this task by introducing intrinsic 
variability into processing and by allowing the network to adapt during testing in 
response to its own outputs. The simulations direct attention to several aspects of the 
experimental data indicating that children generally show gradual change in sensitivity to 
the distance dimension on the balance scale. While a few children show larger changes 
than are characteristic of the model, its ability to account for nearly all of the data using 
continuous processes is consistent with the view that the transition from Rule I to Rule II 
behavior is typically continuous rather than discrete in nature.
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A Connectionist Model of a Continuous Developmental Transition
in the Balance Scale Task
 What is the nature of the underlying knowledge representation that determines 
patterns of performance and developmental change in children? This question has 
inspired an enormous amount of empirical and theoretical work aimed at inferring the 
mechanisms of development from children’s behavior on a set of proportional reasoning 
tasks. Work on one of these, the balance scale task, has been a focus of efforts to address 
this question and has tapped into a greater debate in cognitive science between two 
perspectives. At one end of the spectrum is what we will call the rule-based approach, 
which holds that performance in tasks like the balance scale task is based on a small 
number of distinct and discrete rules that can be used to generate responses to test items. 
Development consists of a progression through the use of a sequence of these rules, 
where the transitions from rule to rule are abrupt. In this view, children’s behavior is not 
simply describable by rules but is actually viewed as being caused by the use of explicit 
rule representations, e.g., through the retrieval of an explicit rule from long-term memory 
to be used in a task (Kerkman & Wright, 1988). At the other end of the spectrum is what 
we will call the continuous perspective, which holds that information is represented in a 
more graded manner that is only approximately characterizable by the kinds of rules in 
rule-based approaches, and transitions between stable stages of performance are not in 
fact so abrupt when considered carefully. The connectionist perspective, an example of a
continuous approach, provides a possible mechanism for this continuous change, where                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   4
knowledge is stored as the weights of connections between processing units in the brain. 
Rule-like behavior in a task like the balance scale task emerges from small incremental 
changes in the weights between these processing units, which in turn lead to incremental 
changes in units’ activations. In the connectionist and, more generally, the continuous 
view, apparent qualitative change need not reflect a discrete transition; behavior that 
might sometimes look like abrupt rule change is seen as arising from incremental change 
in what is underlyingly continuous processing. 
Though connectionist models can approximate to an arbitrary degree of accuracy 
the rule-like behavior of a system that explicitly incorporates rules into knowledge 
representation, the rule-based and continuous approaches have different tendencies in 
their behavior that do not motivate identical empirical predictions. For example, 
especially in periods of transition, a continuous model predicts that there will tend to be 
graded sensitivity to the dimensions relevant to the transition, whereas a strict rule-based 
approach predicts that sensitivity to a particular dimension will either be present or 
absent. The question we address here is whether there is indeed the kind of graded 
sensitivity that would be expected by transitions in continuous models. We consider an 
elaborated version of McClelland’s (1989, 1995) continuous, connectionist model of the 
balance scale task and compare it in detail to aspects of the relevant experimental data. 
The model is used to account for the patterns of performance found in an extensive 
investigation of transitions in balance scale performance by Jansen and van der Maas 
(2001), bringing out aspects of the empirical data that indicate continuity in transition.                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   5
Figure 1. The type of scale used in the balance scale task.
Balance scale task 
In the balance scale task, developed originally by Inhelder and Piaget (1958; 
Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), children are shown a balance scale with a varying number of 
weights placed on pegs on each side, at varying distances from the fulcrum (see Figure 
1). While the movement of the scale is prevented, the children are asked to imagine what 
would happen if the scale were allowed to move freely; they indicate whether they think 
the left or right side of the scale would fall, or whether the two sides would be in balance. 
Siegler (1976, 1981) adopted the balance-scale paradigm to test whether 
children’s behavior on the task is best described by the use of rules. He used six item 
types: balance, weight, distance, conflict-weight, conflict-distance, and conflict-balance. 
Children were classified as using a particular rule based on their responses to test items of 
each of these different types. Balance items have the same number of weights at the same 
distance from the fulcrum on each side. Weight items have different numbers of weights 
on each side at the same distance from the fulcrum. Distance items have the same number 
of weights at different distances. Conflict items have fewer weights at a greater distance 
on one side of the fulcrum and more weights at a smaller distance on the other. In 
conflict-weight items, the correct answer is that the side with more weight falls. In 
conflict-distance items, the correct answer is that the side with weights at a greater                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   6
distance falls. In conflict-balance items, the correct answer is that the sides balance. 
Based on responses to a set of 30 items comprised of the above item types, Siegler 
(1976) claimed that children use one of four rules in determining which side of the 
balance scale falls (see Figure 2). The rules concern how to incorporate information from 
the two relevant dimensions of the task. The first dimension is weight, which is called the 
dominant dimension because younger children appear to be more sensitive to it, and the 
second dimension is distance from the fulcrum, identified as the subordinate dimension. 
According to Siegler’s analysis, children using Rule I make their decision based only on 
the number of weights on each side of the fulcrum. Children using Rule II take distance 
into account when the number of weights on both sides of the fulcrum is equal; otherwise 
they make their decision based only on weight. Children using Rule III always consider 
distance and weight but “muddle through”, guess, or use some other incorrect rule when 
the dimensions conflict. Rule IV is seen only in a minority of adolescents and adults 
(Siegler & Chen, 2002). Individuals using Rule IV correctly make their decision by 
comparing the torques (number of weights multiplied by distance of those weights from 
the fulcrum) on each side of the scale.                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   7
Figure 2. Siegler’s (1976, 1981) decision tree model of the four rules used for answering 
balance scale problems. The dominant dimension is weight and the subordinate 
dimension is distance. Adapted from Figure 1 of Siegler (1981). (Permission for reprint 
pending.)
Since Siegler’s seminal investigations, there have been many additional studies of 
the balance scale task, many of which argue for alternative characterizations of the nature 
of children’s underlying knowledge representations. First, the existence of rules in                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   8
addition to the ones originally studied by Siegler has been suggested (Boom, Hoijtink, & 
Kunnen, 2001; Ferretti, Butterfield, Cahn, & Kerkman, 1985; Normandeau, Larivee, 
Roulin, & Longeot, 1989; Jansen & van der Maas, 2002; Siegler & Chen, 1998; Van 
Maanen, Been, & Sitjsma, 1989). Most relevant here, though, are several instances of 
patterns observed in children’s responses that are not fully consistent with any single rule
(Jansen & van der Maas, 1997, 2002; Siegler, 1981; van der Maas & Jansen, 2003). 
Jansen and van der Maas explained these inconsistencies in terms of rule-switching that 
occurs during transition (1997) but admit that their presence is not ideal for a rule-based 
perspective (2002, p. 384). Another phenomenon that has been used to criticize the rule-
based perspective is the torque difference effect (Ferretti & Butterfield, 1986, 1992; 
Ferretti et al., 1985). Children are more likely to behave in accordance with a more 
advanced rule when the difference between the torques on the two sides of the scale is 
greater. This result is suggestive of a continuous rather than a discrete or categorical rule-
based mechanism. Indeed, using variants of the balance scale task that allow for 
continuity in children’s responses, Wilkening and Anderson (1982, 1991) have found 
direct evidence that children integrate information about weight and distance in a way 
that is better described by the weighted combination of the continuous dimensions of the 
task than by a set of discrete decision-tree rules like Siegler’s.
In a series of relevant articles, Jansen and van der Maas have argued that a rule-
based perspective is the best characterization of children’s development on the balance 
scale task (1997, 2001, 2002; van der Maas & Jansen, 2003; Quinlan, van der Maas, 
Jansen, Booij,  & Rendell, 2007). They subscribe to a definition of rule that requires 
behavior to be regular, consistent, and discontinuous (among other things; Quinlan et al.,                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   9
2007). Although they generally favor a rule-based approach, they conclude that only the 
transition between Rule I and Rule II and the transition to Rule IV actually satisfy their 
conditions (2002). 
One body of data often sited for the discontinuity between Rule I and Rule II is 
from Jansen and van der Maas (2001). The simulations in this paper will address this data 
specifically in order to show that even this transition is not generally discontinuous. 
Jansen and van der Maas apply the so-called cusp model to data on the transition between 
Rule I and Rule II to test for signs of the discontinuity. The cusp model is derived from 
catastrophe theory, a mathematical theory of transition that allows measurement of 
qualitative transitions, which are defined as sudden changes in a dependent variable 
resulting from small continuous changes in an independent variable (Raijmakers, van 
Koten, & Molenaar, 1996). According to van der Maas and Molenaar (1992), the cusp 
model does not specify a mechanism for strategy change; it only describes that change. 
Derived from catastrophe theory are eight indications, called catastrophe flags, that a 
system is undergoing a qualitative transition: bimodality, inaccessibility, sudden jumps, 
divergence, hysteresis, divergence of linear response, critical slowing down/mode 
softening, and anomalous variance (Gilmore, 1981). Jansen and van der Maas (2001) use 
the presence of some of these catastrophe flags in children’s behavior as evidence for the 
discontinuity in transition from Rule I to Rule II.   
Experiment 1 of Jansen and van der Maas (2001)
Jansen and van der Maas (2001) used a paper-and-pencil version of the balance 
scale task to test specifically for the presence of bimodality, inaccessible region, 
hysteresis, sudden jumps, and divergence. The other three catastrophe flags were not                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   10
studied because they were difficult to test for in the experimental paradigm. In 
Experiment 1, 314 children from 6 to 10 years old were tested using pictures of balance 
scales with different combinations of weights and distances (similar to Figure 1). For 
each item, the children had to circle an image corresponding to what they thought the 
scale would look like if the blocking pin preventing the scale from moving were taken 
out. Each child saw a total of 40 items, which were arranged into a practice, pretest, 
hysteresis test, posttest, control test, and divergence test. 
Bimodality and Inaccessibility
Bimodality and inaccessibility were assessed in the pretest, posttest, and 
divergence test. Bimodality in this context refers to a bimodal distribution of scores when 
some items in a test set require behavior at the level of Rule II for correct performance, 
and some only require behavior at the level of Rule I. In the pretest and posttest, there 
were three distance items, one weight item, one conflict-weight item, and one conflict-
distance item. All six items in the divergence test were distance items. In the pretest and 
posttest, based on Siegler’s (1976) rules, children using Rule I would succeed on the 
weight and conflict-weight items, and children using Rule II would succeed on those as 
well as the distance items. Conflict-weight items were not used in the analyses because 
scores on those items negatively correlated with the other item types. The expected 
distribution for scores on the pretest and posttest therefore becomes a bimodal one with 
modes falling on one item correct for Rule I behavior and four items correct for Rule II 
behavior. For the divergence test, the expected distribution has modes at zero correct and 
six correct, since it consists entirely of distance items. Inaccessibility refers to absence of                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   11
scores in the region between these modes, which is expected in a rule-based perspective 
because scores between modes are inconsistent with both Rule I and Rule II behavior.
Hysteresis and Sudden Jump
Hysteresis and sudden jump were assessed in the hysteresis test. The hysteresis 
test consisted of a series of distance items, where the distance difference—the difference 
in the distance of the weights to the fulcrum on the two sides—was incrementally 
increased and then decreased over nine items. Increasing the salience of the distance 
dimension was expected to cause some children using Rule I who are on the verge of 
transition to switch to Rule II, though most children are expected to be consistent Rule I 
or Rule II users. A sudden jump is characterized by an immediate shift to using Rule II as 
the distance difference increases, with no shift back to Rule I as the distance difference 
decreases again. In this application of the cusp model, the child is thought to suddenly 
realize that the distance dimension should be considered at some point during the series 
of increasing distance differences because with each step the distance dimension becomes 
more salient and therefore easier to encode. Such a transition to the use of Rule II could 
then lead the child to continue to perform correctly on distance items for the rest of the 
hysteresis test. Another pattern, hysteresis (also called the delay pattern), occurs if the 
child shifts to using Rule II as in the sudden jump, as the distance difference increases, 
and then shifts back to using Rule I at a lower distance difference than the one at which 
she shifted to Rule II. The child persists in Rule II behavior until the distance dimension 
becomes less salient than it was when she made the switch to Rule II. In the cusp model, 
the presence of this pattern is considered sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
transition in question in discontinuous. A third pattern a child can follow in the hysteresis                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   12
test is the Maxwell convention, which is like hysteresis except that the child switches 
back to Rule I use at the same distance difference that she switched to Rule II use. The 
Maxwell convention is not considered a catastrophe flag. Patterns of this type would be 
expected if the child simply had a graded sensitivity to distance, allowing correct 
performance on items with large distance differences to coexist with incorrect ‘balance’ 
responses for small distance differences.
The control test was designed to control for the possibility that children would 
change their responses in the hysteresis test because they were seeing so many of the 
same type of item in a row. The grayness of the weights was gradually changed from 
black to white and back to black over the nine items. Identical distance items were used 
in this test with a distance difference of three. 
Divergence
The last catastrophe flag, divergence, was assessed in the divergence test. The 
divergence test had six items, which were all distance items with a distance difference of 
two. Three of the items had one weight on each side, and three had five weights on each 
side. The divergence hypothesis, as stated by Jansen and van der Maas, is that the 
distribution of scores for the items with five weights is expected to be more bimodal than 
the distribution of scores for the items with one weight. They expect that children will be 
more likely to behave consistently with whichever rule they are using when the dominant 
dimension, weight, is more salient.
Summary of Results
The pretest, posttest, and divergence test distributions all showed the bimodality 
catastrophe flag as expected (see Figure 3). The modes for pretest and posttest were at                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   13
scores of one and four and the modes for the divergence test were at scores of zero and 
six. There was also some degree of inaccessibility between the two modes, with fewer 
occurrences of scores that indicate behavior between Rule I and Rule II, especially in the 
divergence test. Scores falling in the inaccessible region were attributed to response 
errors, guessing (p. 475), and children having poor numerical abilities (p. 490). There was 
an effect of learning from the pretest to the posttest, where a significant number of 
children moved from scores of one on the pretest to higher scores on the posttest.                                                                                          Connectionist Model                   14
Children's scores on pretest
0
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Figure 3. Results from Jansen and van der Maas (2001, Experiment 1). Distributions of 
children’s scores on the pretest, posttest, and divergence test. A child’s score for a given 
test was not counted in the distribution if any of the values for that test were missing. 
(Permission for reprint pending.)                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   15
The hysteresis and sudden jump catastrophe flags were present in the hysteresis 
test. Out of 314 children, 7 (2.228%) displayed a hysteresis pattern, 26 (8.280%) 
displayed a sudden jump pattern, and 11 (3.503%) displayed a Maxwell convention 
pattern. In the control item set, no children displayed hysteresis or Maxwell patterns, and 
9 (2.866%) children displayed a sudden jump pattern. In their article, Jansen and van der 
Maas used both strict rule assessment and latent class analysis in their classification of 
children’s responses. The latter analysis method is controversial (see Shultz & Takane, 
2007), so in our discussion of their results here and elsewhere, we consider only the 
findings based on strict rule assessment. It should be noted, however, that in the Jansen 
and van der Maas analysis, both scoring methods supported the same conclusions.
The divergence catastrophe flag was not found in the divergence test. The 
distribution of the scores for items with five weights and the distribution of scores for 
items with one weight were not significantly different.
In summary, four of the five catastrophe flags studied were found in the 
experiment: bimodality, inaccessibility, hysteresis, and sudden jump. There was also an 
overall learning effect from the pretest to the posttest. 
McClelland’s (1989) Model
We next present a simulation of McClelland’s (1989) model of the Jansen and van 
der Maas experiment (2001, Experiment 1), looking specifically for the presence of 
bimodality, inaccessibility, hysteresis, sudden jump, and overall learning. The model has 
been criticized for not exhibiting the catastrophe flags seen in children’s responses 
(Raijmakers et al., 1996), and our simulations confirm that the model falls short of                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   16
accounting for most of these trends in the data. This exploration of the original model 
will serve as a basis for understanding the extensions we later add that allow a 
significantly better fit to the data.
Representation of the task 
The network makes the same decision as the human subjects; namely, when given 
a scale with a certain number of weights at certain distances from the fulcrum, the 
network decides if the left side of the scale goes down, if the right side of the scale goes 
down, or if the sides balance. The network’s simple three-layer architecture is shown in 
Figure 4.
      
Figure 4. Network used in the McClelland (1989, 1995) model of the balance scale task. 
The input units that are filled in are activated to represent the network being presented 
with the balance scale item shown. The separation of the input units into the left and right 
sides of the fulcrum and the ordering of the weight and distance units from lowest to                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   17
highest, as depicted, are unknown to the model before training. Reprinted from Figure 2.7 
of McClelland (1989). (Permission for reprint pending.)
There are 20 input units, which are used to represent the numbers of weights and 
distances of those weights from the fulcrum for a given item. Each of these 20 units 
corresponds to a different possible weight or distance value. Five of the input units are 
used to represent one through five weights on the left side of the scale, five are used to 
represent a distance of one through five pegs from the fulcrum on the left side of the 
scale, and similarly for the ten units representing the right side. The network does not 
know before training which input units correspond to which numbers of weights and 
distances on the scale. The input units have activations of 1 when they are being used to 
represent a certain weight/distance combination and 0 otherwise. 
Each of the 10 weight units projects to two of the hidden units, and each of the 10 
distance units project to the other two hidden units. This architecture implements the 
assumption that weight and distance are separately assessed before they are combined 
when participants reason about balance scales (see McClelland, 1989, 1995, for further 
discussion). Each of the four hidden units projects to each of the two output units. The 
output units, L and R, correspond to the scale tipping to the left or to the right. The 
network’s representation of the left side tipping would have the L output unit near an 
activation of 1 and the R output unit near an activation of 0, and vice versa if the right 
side tips. Activations near 0.5 for both L and R indicate the network’s decision that the 
scale balances. More specifically, if the activation of the L output unit is less than 1/3, the                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   18
right side is interpreted as falling. If the activation of the L output unit is greater than 2/3, 
the left side is interpreted as falling. Otherwise the scale is interpreted as balancing.
Training 
The training set has all the possible combinations of one through five weights at 
one through five distances on one peg on the left and one through five weights at one 
through five distances on one peg on the right, for a total of 5 x 5 x 5 x 5 = 625 items. 
There are also nine added copies of the combinations that have weights at the same 
distance from the fulcrum (1125 items added, 1750 total). These copies predispose the 
network to treat weight as the dominant dimension. (Whether greater exposure to cases in 
which weight varies is in fact the true basis of the dominance of weight is not clear. 
Although McClelland, 1989, argued that this is one possible basis for the effect, another 
is that distance is a more complex relationship, depending jointly on the position of the 
weights and the position of the fulcrum. See McClelland, 1995, for discussion.) The 
weights connecting the input and hidden layers and the hidden and output layers are 
initialized with random values uniformly distributed between -0.5 and +0.5. The network 
is trained each epoch on the entire set described above in randomly permuted order. 
Weights are updated after each item is presented using back-propagation. No momentum 
is used, and the learning rate is 0.02. 
Testing
After every epoch of training, the network was tested on a version of the items 
used by Jansen and van der Maas (2001) that excluded items with values of six for weight 
or distance (see details of the items in the Appendix). These items were always presented 
in the same order. All of the items were identical in the control test, since the color of the                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   19
weights is not represented within the structure of the model. As in earlier simulations 
with this model, the connection weights were frozen during test sessions so that there was 
no change in the network’s response as a result of experience with test items. 
The network was run independently 10 times and epochs 5 to 60 of each run were 
used in analysis. The test session at the end of each epoch is meant to represent an 
individual child doing the experiment. The range of epochs was chosen to obtain an
approximate match to the overall range of performance across the children tested in 
Jansen and van der Maas (2001). 
Results  
The data for the pretest, posttest, and divergence test items all showed bimodality. 
As in the data from Jansen & van der Maas (2001), the modes for the pretest and posttest 
distributions were at scores of one and four, and the modes for the divergence test 
distribution were at scores of zero and six (see Figure 5). Though there is a clear 
inaccessible region in the data from the divergence test, there is a less pronounced 
inaccessible region in the pretest and posttest. There is also no learning effect from 
pretest to posttest, which is expected because there is no basis for any change in 
performance during the test phase of the network. Accordingly, the pretest and posttest 
distributions are almost identical.                                                                                          Connectionist Model                   20
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Figure 5. Results from a simulation of McClelland’s (1989) model on the items from
Jansen and van der Mass (2001). Distributions of pretest, posttest, and divergence test                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   21
session scores. Ten independent networks were each tested after epochs 5 through 60, 
thereby contributing 56 scores per network. Statistical tests and confidence intervals treat 
the network as the random effect factor, although the random sequence of training 
experiences within each epoch induces considerable (though not complete) independence 
between epochs within networks. 
The sudden jump and hysteresis catastrophe flags were not present, which is also
expected because there is no basis for change in the network’s performance during test. 
Out of 560 trials, there were no hysteresis or sudden jump patterns and 91 (16.250%) 
Maxwell convention patterns. In the control items, there were no hysteresis, sudden jump, 
or Maxwell patterns. 
As in Jansen and van der Maas (2001), the divergence hypothesis was not 
supported by the network data. The distribution for the items with one weight and the 
distribution for the items with five weights were very similar [
2 (3, N = 560) = 2.2166, p
= 0.5287].
Discussion
As in earlier investigations, the McClelland (1989) model appears to capture 
many of the patterns seen in children’s balance scale behavior.  Indeed, when there were 
deviations from rule-like behavior observed in children (Siegler, 1981), they tended to be
similar to the types of deviations observed in the model (McClelland, 1989), a result very 
suggestive of the need for some continuity in the mechanisms underlying this task. In the 
present case, these deviations are represented by the fact that, although there is indeed 
bimodality and inaccessibility in children’s scores on the balance scale task, neither                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   22
children nor the model exhibit complete inaccessibility. The tendency of a fraction of the 
children and a fraction of the network testing sessions to result in intermediate scores is 
suggestive of the presence of at least some degree of underlying continuity in children as 
in the model. The model exhibits several other effects seen in the data that also point to 
underlying continuity. One of these is the torque difference effect (McClelland, 1995), 
documented by Ferretti & Butterfield (1986, 1992) and Ferretti et al. (1985). Another is 
the relative frequency of scores of three compared to two in the inaccessible region of the 
pretest and posttest distributions (shown in Figure 5). Usually when the network had a 
score of three on the pretest or posttest, it was performing correctly on the two distance 
items with a distance difference of two and incorrectly on the distance item with a 
distance difference of one, corresponding to data from Jansen and van der Maas (2002) 
that larger distance differences cause many children to be more likely to respond 
correctly. The presence of Maxwell patterns in the hysteresis test is another indication of 
graded sensitivity to the distance dimension, since Maxwell patterns represent better 
performance on items with higher distance difference. Maxwell patterns are also seen in 
the data from Jansen and van der Maas (2001), though not as frequently as in the 
simulation.
There are thus many successes of this model in describing the overall appearance 
of general rule-like behavior as well as the observed deviations from that behavior. The 
model uses no explicit representations of rules, suggesting that the patterns of children’s 
behavior on this task may not need to be explained through use of rules. The results also 
suggest the stronger point that a more continuous account may be required to account for                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   23
many of the details of the data, since a strict rule-based account would not predict any
scores in the ‘inaccessible’ region, or any Maxwell patterns. 
Despite the successes, this model does have significant shortcomings. It is not 
able to show any changes in scores from pretest to posttest, and does not show the sudden 
jump and hysteresis catastrophe flags found by Jansen and van der Maas (2001). These 
transitional behaviors are important for the model to account for, and the sudden jump 
and hysteresis catastrophe flags in particular might seem to pose a challenge for the 
graded, continuous mechanisms of the model. We now present extensions to the model, 
however, that allow it exhibit all of these effects while still in this continuous framework, 
suggesting that these catastrophe flags are perhaps not so indicative of discontinuous 
change after all.
Extensions to the Model
The most basic limitation of the McClelland (1989, 1995) model is that there is no 
basis for change in performance during test sessions, making hysteresis, sudden jump, 
and overall learning effects impossible. Since children are given no feedback on balance 
scale outcomes during testing, and since the back-propagation learning algorithm used in 
the model drives connection weight adjustment in proportion to the difference between 
predicted and observed outcomes (McClelland, 1994), it is clear that no change in 
performance is possible in the model at all during test. This is a shortcoming of an 
assumption built into the back-propagation model that learning is only possible when 
there is an error signal, and some adjustment to this assumption is necessary to deal with 
the possibility of behavioral change in the absence of explicit feedback from the 
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There are several approaches that might be taken in addressing this shortcoming. 
One way to learn when outcome information is not available would be to rely on Hebbian 
learning. As discussed elsewhere (McClelland, 2006; Vallabha & McClelland, 2007), 
Hebbian learning tends to reinforce whatever response a network makes to a particular 
input. This might lead to hysteresis or possibly even a sudden jump, if the network were 
to make a correct response to an item with a large distance difference, as we have seen 
that is sometimes does, part-way through the hysteresis test. In the spirit of this 
observation, we adopted the following policy for training the network during the test 
phase. As before, the network’s output was categorized into one of three response 
patterns: left side down, right side down, or balance. Once categorized in this way, the 
ideal output patterns corresponding to the chosen response category [(1, 0), (0, 1), or (.5, 
.5)] were then used as teaching input for the computation of the error signal used in the 
back-propagation learning rule. While this policy is not identical to Hebbian learning, it 
has the same effect of reinforcing whatever response the network has previously made to 
a given input.
Learning during test
One way that this self-teaching signal can be used is in changing the network’s 
connection weights during the test sessions in the same way as done during training. We 
tried this, discarding the weight changes at the end of each test session, so that a given 
test session would not affect performance on a later test session using the same network.   
This policy is appropriate in our case because we are modeling effects of experience 
during testing in children who are never tested twice.  Rather than re-initialize each 
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occurred during testing before continuing with network training. Thus, at the beginning 
of each test session, the weights were saved, and after test they were restored to the saved 
copy before the next epoch of training.
Training the network during the test phase on its own responses did result in a 
significant number of patterns of hysteresis and sudden jump, but this policy for changing 
the network’s weights caused the network’s performance on the posttest to be worse than 
on the pretest. The reason for this is that the weight changes produced by a response 
favoring, say, the left side down tended to favor left side down responses to later items. 
This produced a disadvantage in the posttest, since the pretest distance items favored one 
side of the scale while the posttest distance items favored the other. It is interesting that 
hysteresis and sudden jump patterns thought to indicate a phase change can coexist with a 
general decrease in level of performance. However, the model’s tendency to perform 
worse on the posttest than the pretest is not consistent with Jansen and van der Maas’s 
(2001) findings, and whatever change is occurring in children’s performance is unlikely 
to depend on a learned position bias. No support for the divergence hypothesis was found 
in these simulations or in fact in any of the simulations we ran on any version of the 
model.
We considered several variants of the training regime, including two ways of 
forcing symmetry in weight changes, and we also explored a variant architecture with 
only four input units. These simulations succeeded in eliminating the position bias, and 
fared somewhat better overall than the one described above, but they were not as 
successful as adaptive modification of gain, discussed below. More details about these 
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Adaptive Modification of Gain 
Another way the self-teaching signal can be used to change behavior during test is 
by modulating attention to the weight and distance dimensions via a gain parameter. The 
term gain is used in the connectionist literature to refer to a constant that scales the net 
input to units in the network, such that higher values of gain induce larger changes in 
activation from given changes in net input. Adjustment of gain has been proposed as one 
way of implementing an attention-like mechanism in connectionist networks (Krushke, 
1992; Krushke & Movellan, 1991), since this increased sensitivity to the net input can be 
thought of as increased attention to the information coming from the input. Following 
Krushke (1992), we adopted the idea that dimensional attention, operationalized as an 
adjustment to a dimension-specific gain parameter, might be adjusted using an error-
driven, gradient-descent procedure. We gave the distance and weight hidden unit pools 
separate gain values that represent relative attention to the distance and weight 
dimensions. For simplicity, gain was allowed to vary during testing only. At the 
beginning of each test run, gain was initialized at 1.0.  Subsequently, gain was adjusted 
using the back-propagated self-teaching signal. Gain was updated after each item at test 
as follows: 
gp_new = gp_old  + γ*Σi (δip*netip)
where gp_new  is the new gain for the hidden unit pool p (ranging over the weight hidden 
unit pool and the distance hidden unit pool), gp_old  is the old gain for the hidden pool p, 
δip is the standard back-propagation delta term (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) for 
unit i in pool p, netip is the net input to that unit, and γ is the learning rate parameter for 
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next item by applying the logistic function after scaling a unit’s net input (with noise 
added, as discussed below) by gp_new. Like the weight adjustment at test, this procedure 
tends to encourage the network toward the response it has just given to the current input, 
but in this case connection weights are not actually changing and instead the scalar 
multiplier on the net input was used to calculate activation changes.
Noise
While the McClelland (1989, 1995) model was completely deterministic in its 
behavior during the test phase, it is clear that human behavior exhibits some variability. 
Many connectionist models capture variability by translating deterministic activations 
into probabilities at the response-selection stage (e.g., McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981).  
Subsequent research has indicated, however, that there can be problems with this 
approach. A robust solution to these problems is provided by assuming that variability is 
actually intrinsic to processing within the network (McClelland, 1991, 1993; Movellan 
and McClelland, 2001; Usher and McClelland, 2001). In keeping with the approach taken 
in the cited papers, a sample of normally distributed zero-mean Gaussian noise was added 
to a given unit’s net input before its activation was calculated. 
Parameters and simulation details. The gain learning rate parameter  was set to 1 
and the standard deviation of the noise was set to 0.1 in the reported simulations. Other 
values tried produced less satisfactory fits to the data. All other parameters and training 
and testing procedures are the same as in the simulation with the McClelland (1989) 
model. These results are from 30 independent networks, tested at the end of each epoch 
of training, using epochs 5 to 60 in analysis. Gain was fixed at 1 during training of all of 
the networks, and was reset to 1 at the beginning of each test.                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   28
Results
The pretest, posttest, and divergence test distributions all showed bimodality and 
an inaccessible region (at least to a degree similar to that found by Jansen & van der 
Maas, 2001), which were especially pronounced in the posttest and divergence test 
distributions (see Figure 6). The modes in all three distributions were at the expected 
scores.
1 The pretest and posttest distributions were significantly different [
2 (5, N = 
1680) = 28.6372, p <  0.0001], with a trend from pretest to posttest similar to that found 
by Jansen and van der Maas (2001). We did a one-tailed sign test across networks to 
determine whether there was an overall increase in scores from pretest to posttest. The 
mean scores on the pretest and posttest were compared for each of the 30 networks, and 
the null hypothesis, that there is no tendency for an increase in scores from pretest to 
posttest, was rejected with p < 0.0001. The null hypothesis was as definitively rejected 
for the Jansen and van der Maas data. 
                                                
1 The pretest, posttest, and divergence distributions in the Jansen and van der Maas 
data have a bias towards lower scores compared to the model, indicating a difference 
in the overall distribution of abilities between the model and the participants tested in 
the Jansen and van der Maas experiment. Whereas the sampling in the network was 
uniform across epochs, the sampling of children was not completely uniform across 
ages. Since our focus is on patterns of transition, we did not adjust the distribution of 
epochs used in testing to more closely match those of children.                                                                                          Connectionist Model                   29
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Figure 6. Results from an extension of McClelland’s (1989) model with noise and gain. 
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There were again 56 scores per network. Confidence interval calculations were done in 
the same was as in Figure 5. 
We also did a more detailed analysis of the trends in the scores from pretest to 
posttest both for individual test sessions of the networks and for individual children. The 
purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the change from pretest to posttest 
involved a graded change or sudden transition from Rule I to Rule II performance, both 
for children and for the networks. As shown in Table 1, Rule I or Rule II behavior was 
maintained consistently from pretest to posttest for 49.664% of the children and for 
66.131% of the test sessions of all 30 networks. Where there was a pretest to posttest 
change, it was often from a score of 1 to a score of 2 or 3, or from a score of 2 or 3 to a 
score of 4.  This was true of children, as well as of the networks. For example, of the 
children that had a score of 1 on the pretest and a higher score on the posttest, the score 
actually fell in the grey zone between 1 and 4 57.409% of the time. For the model, the 
score fell in the grey zone 89.222% of the time. Overall, these data indicate that the 
change from pretest to posttest is often graded in children, but more discrete changes also 
occur. In the model, graded changes predominate, although there are some cases of an 
apparent “discrete stage” transition.
2
                                                
2 We used a higher level of noise in the model to see if this would produce more 
large changes in score from pretest to posttest. While this did produce greater variability 
in both the pretest and posttest scores, it did not result in more jumps from a score of 1 to 
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Table 1
Percentages of Children and Model Test Sessions Displaying Each Combination of 
Pretest and Posttest score.
Note. Children with any missing values in the pretest or posttest were removed from 
analyses. N = 298 for children; N = 1680 for model.
The divergence hypothesis was again not supported by the networks’ results. 
There was no significant difference between the distribution of scores for items with one 
weight and the distribution of scores for items with five weights [
2 (3, N = 1680) = 
0.9673, p = 0.8092]. 
Children
Posttest score
0 1 2 3 4 5 Pretest totals
0 3.691 0.671 0.671 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.034
1 0.671 33.221 5.705 4.698 6.711 1.007 52.013
2 0.000 1.678 0.671 1.007 0.671 0.336 4.362
3 0.336 0.336 1.342 1.342 4.698 0.336 8.389
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.356 16.443 4.698 24.497
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.007 1.342 3.356 5.705
Posttest totals 4.698 35.906 8.389 11.409 29.866 9.732
Model
Posttest score
0 1 2 3 4 5 Pretest totals
0 4.583 0.595 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.179
1 0.833 27.024 2.262 1.190 0.417 0.000 31.726
2 0.000 1.607 1.250 1.012 0.357 0.000 4.226
3 0.000 0.357 0.833 5.655 8.631 0.060 15.536
4 0.000 0.060 0.060 2.440 39.107 0.714 42.381
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.714 0.952
Posttest totals 5.417 29.643 4.405 10.298 48.750 1.488
Pretest 
score
Pretest 
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Table 2 
Percentages of Children and Model Test Sessions Displaying Different Types of Patterns 
in Hysteresis Test
Note. The second column indicates the distance difference in the first half of the 
hysteresis items (as the distance difference rises) at which responses begin to be correct, 
and the third column indicates the last distance difference in the second half of the 
hysteresis items (as the distance difference falls) at which responses are still correct. N =
314 for children; N = 1680 for model.  Dashes are given for untested model conditions (in 
the model the maximum distance difference is 4).
Type of pattern
First correct 
rising
Last correct 
falling Children Model
Rule I - - 31.847 29.464
Rule II 1 1 32.484 51.012
Hysteresis 5 4 0.000 -
Hysteresis 5 3 0.955 -
Hysteresis 5 2 0.318 -
Hysteresis 4 3 0.318 0.595
Hysteresis 4 2 0.000 0.417
Hysteresis 3 2 0.637 1.012
Maxwell 2 2 1.592 3.214
Maxwell 3 3 1.592 1.012
Maxwell 4 4 0.318 1.250
Maxwell 5 5 0.000 -
Sudden jump 2 1 4.140 4.881
Sudden jump 3 1 0.637 0.298
Sudden jump 4 1 1.592 0.000
Sudden jump 5 1 1.911 -
Residual - - 15.924 6.845
Missing Values - - 5.732 -
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Both the hysteresis and sudden jump catastrophe flags were found in the model’s 
performance on the hysteresis item set. Of the 1680 total test sessions, 34 (2.024%) were 
hysteresis patterns, 87 (5.179%) were sudden jump patterns, and 92 (5.476%) were 
Maxwell patterns. In the control test, there was 1 (0.060%) hysteresis pattern, 7 (0.417%) 
sudden jump patterns, and 8 (0.476%) Maxwell patterns. The difference between the 
distributions on the two tests was highly significant [
2 (5, N = 1680) = 189.5052, p < 
0.0001].
Table 2 shows detailed data comparing the types of patterns displayed by the 
children and the model in the hysteresis test. For each pattern, we indicate the size of the 
distance difference for the first item correct in the sequence of items with rising distance 
difference and of the last item correct in the sequence of items with falling distance 
difference. Of particular interest is the tendency for the sudden jumps displayed by both 
the model and the children to occur at small values of the distance difference. For both 
the children and the model, by far the most common sudden jump involves shifting from 
the incorrect ‘balance’ response when the difference distance is 1 to the correct distance-
based response with a difference distance of 2, and then persisting with this same 
response through the rest of the hysteresis test, including the final test item for which the 
difference distance is 1. In the network, this kind of pattern arises when the network is 
already somewhat sensitive to distance difference, so that once the distance difference 
starts to grow, a shift to Rule II behavior occurs. Modest gain adjustment is then 
sufficient to produce a slight change in sensitivity to distance that looks like a ‘sudden 
jump’. It is true that the children are more likely than the model to show larger sudden                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   34
jump patterns, but these cases are quite rare: cases in which the ‘sudden jump’ occurred 
at a distance difference of 4 or 5 only occurred in a total of 3.503% of children (11/314).  
Similarly, when there is a hysteresis pattern, the extent of the hysteresis effect is 
often rather small, both for the children and for the network. Only seven children 
(2.229%) showed hysteresis effects, and of these, three involved a shift of only one step, 
three a shift of two steps, and one a shift of three steps. The model had about the same 
rate of hysteresis, but there was a larger sample of cases (34) due to the large number of 
model test sessions (1680).  For the model, a shift of size 1 occurred in 79.397% of the 
cases, but shifts of size 2 were also observed (7 cases). 
Finally, it is worth noting once again the presence of Maxwell patterns in both the 
children and the network. Such patterns occurred in 3.503% of the children and 5.476% 
of model test sessions. Such patterns are not to be expected under a rule-based account, 
even one in which a large distance different triggers attention to the distance dimension. 
Such patterns are, however, expected if there are some children who truly have a 
relatively weak response to differences along the distance dimension.
Discussion 
Introducing noise into processing and allowing the network to adapt during 
testing in response to its own outputs has resulted in an extended version of the 
McClelland (1989) model that exhibits many of the same trends seen in the data from 
Jansen and van der Maas (2001, Experiment 1). Among these trends is the presence of 
four catastrophe flags: bimodality, inaccessibility, hysteresis, and sudden jump. Drawing 
on the cusp model, Jansen and van der Maas have used the presence of these flags as 
evidence that the transition between Rule I and Rule II behavior is discontinuous. The                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   35
presence of hysteresis, in particular, has been considered sufficient evidence for 
discontinuity (Jansen & van der Maas, 2001, p. 457, Quinlan et al., 2007, p. 421, 
Raijmakers et al., 1996, p.105) and a means of distinguishing between acceleration and 
discontinuous change (Jansen & van der Maas, 2001, p. 452).  
Since our model exhibits these same catastrophe flags, are we forced to conclude 
that it is exhibiting discontinuous change? While we are sympathetic to the cusp model’s 
ability to capture discontinuities that can arise from an underlying continuous change, 
there are many reasons to think that our model is not really exhibiting a true 
discontinuity. The most convincing evidence is perhaps from the analysis of changes in 
score occurring within individual test sessions. In the model, the vast majority of the 
transitions that occurred from Rule I behavior were not to Rule II behavior. Though there 
was an overall trend of scoring lower on the pretest than on the posttest, scores were not 
generally jumping from one to four within a given test session. Also, as noted in the 
discussion of the simulation using the original version of the model, the reason that there 
were a relatively large number of scores of three compared to two in the inaccessible 
region of the pretest and the posttest is that the network has a graded sensitivity to the 
distance dimension. The items that were used in analysis of the pretest and posttest are 
three distance items, one weight item, and one conflict-distance item. Two of the distance 
items have a distance difference of two and one of them has a distance difference of one. 
Since the distance difference of two requires less sensitivity to the distance dimension, 
the network performed correctly on those as well as the weight item (resulting in a score 
of three) before it reached stable Rule II performance, where it could take even a distance 
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discussed before, also implies a graded sensitivity to distance, since it meant the network 
performed correctly on varying values of distance difference in the hysteresis test. In 
addition, the sudden jumps that occurred in the hysteresis test tended to occur at low 
values of distance difference, as would be expected if children who already had a 
moderate degree of sensitivity to distance difference simply increased their attention to 
this dimension slightly. Based on the above, we conclude that the model is capable of 
(various degrees of) incremental change and that such incremental change can underlie 
the appearance of catastrophe flags. 
In fact, the children exhibited, in large part, the same qualitative signs of 
continuity and graded sensitivity that the network did. As in the network, the majority of 
the transitions that occurred from Rule I behavior in children were not to Rule II 
behavior. The children also had a significant number of scores in the inaccessible region, 
suggesting again some graded sensitivity to the distance dimension. The presence of 
slightly more scores of three than two may also reflect the distance difference effect seen 
in the network. Like the network, a few children also exhibited Maxwell patterns in the 
hysteresis test, again suggesting graded sensitivity to the distance dimension. Many 
children also show ‘sudden jumps’ on the low end of the distance difference progression 
and small shifts in performance on the hysteresis test. All these are patterns consistent 
with graded sensitivity to distance difference and incremental change in that sensitivity 
during testing.
As mentioned before, Jansen and van der Maas (2001) attributed scores in the 
inaccessible region to response errors, guessing (p. 475), and children having poor 
numerical abilities (p. 490). As stated, these ideas do not explain the presence of patterns                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   37
like the hysteresis and Maxwell pattern in the hysteresis test (see Table 1). Response 
errors and guessing would be expected to result in hysteresis and Maxwell patterns just as 
often in the control test as in the hysteresis test. Jansen and van der Maas also speculate 
that having poor numerical abilities might prevent children from carrying out proper Rule 
I or Rule II behavior because they cannot properly count and compare the numbers of 
weights and distance from the fulcrum on each side. Once again, it is not clear how such 
failures would lead to Maxwell or hysteresis patterns. We would agree that children are 
not necessarily counting and comparing numbers of weights and distances, since their 
behavior indicates that they are likely to be employing more implicit processes. 
Jansen and van der Maas (2002) do notice that children “may be sensitive to 
variations in distance difference during this transitional period” (p. 412), and they 
identified many children with a sensitivity to distance difference as exhibiting behavior 
between Rule I and Rule II. Since this sensitivity to variations in distance difference 
causes behavior that is not expected in use of either Rule I or Rule II, this does not seem 
consistent with the position that the transition between Rule I and Rule II is 
discontinuous. They still appear to hold this position in Quinlan et. al (2007) when they 
cite the 2001 work as evidence that behavior consists of “phases of stable performance 
interspersed with abrupt changes in performance indicative of definite shifts between 
qualitatively different states” (p. 421). Jansen and van der Maas (2002) seem to regard 
the distance difference effects as relatively unimportant (p. 410). We hope the results of 
our model will help to strengthen the case for the view that signs of continuity in the 
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In the simulations presented, we have not addressed several of the important 
aspects of behavior in the balance scale task. Among these are the acquisition of the 
torque rule and the nature of the transitions that occur in the grey zone between Rule II 
and Rule IV behavior. We chose to focus on the data surrounding the transition from 
Rule I to Rule II since it is here that others have tended to see some of the clearest 
support for a discontinuous change in behavior. We do think that the transition to Rule IV 
may in fact be discontinuous, as most children who conform to the Rule IV pattern may 
indeed be carrying out an explicit multiplication of weight and distance (see McClelland 
1989, 1995; McClelland & Jenkins, 1991, for discussion). It is also possible that some of 
the patterns that have been seen between Rule II and Rule IV could be influenced by 
more explicit rules or strategies such as the ‘Buggy Rule’. All such cases involve 
situations in which children are clearly sensitive to both weight and distance dimensions, 
and may suggest that resort to explicit strategies is a consequence of confronting 
situations where two different cues the participant is sensitive to are placed in conflict. 
For the simple cases (weight, distance, and balance items), where the cues are not pitted 
against each other, more implicit tendencies of the kind exhibited by our model may 
characterize the behavior of many, if not all, children. 
Even in Rule I and Rule II behavior, it is possible that explicit rules are used by 
children in some cases, and there are signs that for some children the transition from Rule 
I to Rule II behavior may be more discontinuous. Children were more likely than the 
model to transition from Rule I behavior on the pretest to Rule II behavior on the posttest, 
and such transitions would be expected if children were using explicit rules. Similarly, in 
the hysteresis test, children were more likely to exhibit large sudden jumps than our                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   39
model was. However, even here, caution is in order. Though the model exhibits this 
behavior less frequently, it does exhibit it sometimes, suggesting that a continuous 
mechanism may be at play even in cases where children’s behavior shows an apparent 
sudden transition. It is also possible that there would be other ways to adjust a 
connectionist network (e.g., by making it recurrent, rather than strictly feed-forward) that 
would give rise to a greater degree of apparent discontinuity from a change process (such 
as connection or gain adjustment) that is underlyingly incremental in nature.
Conclusions
We have presented a connectionist model that accounts for many of the trends 
found by Jansen and van der Maas (2001) in children’s transition from Rule I to Rule II 
behavior on the balance scale task. Looking closely at this transition in children and in 
the model has shed some light on the nature of children’s underlying knowledge 
representation, since many of the details of the data seem to be more consistent with the 
continuous than the rule-based perspective, for many if not all children. Children go 
through periods of stable performance that can be described by certain qualitative 
properties, e.g. showing little or no sensitivity to an important cue such as distance while 
performing correctly with respect to the weight cue; or performing correctly on problems 
requiring use of both weight and distance cues. The transitions between these qualitative 
patterns are not always discontinuous, however, since intermediate behavior is often
observed in the transitional periods. Describing performance in terms of rules can provide 
an approximate characterization of behavior, since children spend most of their 
developmental time in periods of stasis between transitions. This relative accuracy of 
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behavior is in the form of rules, and the observed behavior at transition and our model’s 
ability to account for it suggest that in fact this is often not the case.
The true picture likely involves a complex relationship between implicit and 
explicit levels of knowledge representation and the roles that they play in determining the 
way that children solve the items on the balance scale task. Perhaps children are forming 
explicit rules as approximate self-descriptions of their implicit knowledge or are 
integrating these different types of knowledge in some other way (see McClelland, 1995, 
for further discussion). Our perspective is not that discrete and explicit knowledge does 
not exist or that it is not important, but rather that researchers advocating more discrete 
perspectives are often ignoring clear signs of at least some degree of continuity in their 
data.  
The overall level of success of the presented model of the transition from Rule I 
to Rule II behavior strongly suggests that the rule-based perspective cannot be the 
complete account of developmental change on the balance scale task. Several patterns of 
behavior that were thought to suggest rule use have been displayed by a model that does 
not explicitly represent rules, and observed behavior that deviates from the rule-based 
perspective has proven to fit naturally into the continuous perspective. Though future 
research is likely to lead to a more subtle understanding of the roles and interactions of 
continuous and discrete forms of knowledge, our findings suggest that models that stress 
underlying continuity in behavior have a significant role to play in the emerging picture 
of the mechanisms of developmental transitions.                                                                                          Connectionist Model                   41
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Appendix A
Details of network testing items
weights left weights right
item part of test item type number    position number    position
1 Practice distance    2               5    2               3
2 Practice conflict-distance    3               2    4               1
3 Practice conflict-weight    1               5    2               4
4 Practice weight    2               3    4               3
5 Pretest distance    5               1    5               3
6 Pretest weight    5               4    3               4
7 Pretest distance    3               2    3               4
8 Pretest conflict-weight    1               5    2               3
9 Pretest distance    4               3    4               4
10 Pretest conflict-distance    3               3    5               1
11 Hysteresis test distance    5               1    5               2
12 Hysteresis test distance    5               1    5               3
13 Hysteresis test distance    5               1    5               4
14 Hysteresis test distance    5               1    5               5
15 Hysteresis test distance    5               1    5               4
16 Hysteresis test distance    5               1    5               3
17 Hysteresis test distance    5               1    5               2
18 Posttest distance    5               3    5               1
19 Posttest weight    3               4    5               4
20 Posttest distance    3               4    3               2
21 Posttest conflict-weight    2               3    1               5
22 Posttest distance    4               4    4               3
23 Posttest conflict-distance    5               1    3               3
24 Control test distance    5               1    5               4 
25 Control test distance    5               1    5               4 
26 Control test distance    5               1    5               4
27 Control test distance    5               1    5               4
28 Control test distance    5               1    5               4
29 Control test distance    5               1    5               4
30 Control test distance    5               1    5               4
31 Divergence test distance    1               3    1               1
32 Divergence test distance    5               1    5               3
33 Divergence test distance    1               2    1               4
34 Divergence test distance    5               3    5               1
35 Divergence test distance    5               2    5               4
36 Divergence test distance    1               1    1               3
Modifications from the Jansen and van der Maas (2001) items are a change in the 
position of the weights to the left in the third practice item from 6 to 5, and two items 
deleted from each of the hysteresis test and control test to account for the network’s 
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Appendix B
Explored Extensions
Reflecting the test set
As discussed in Learning during test above, the weight adjustment during test 
induced a side preference in the model which was not apparent in children’s behavior, 
since in the specific materials used by Jansen and van der Mass, the pretest and 
hysteresis test all relied on distance items with the greater distance on the same side, 
and the posttest items used greater distance on the opposite side. We tried to eliminate 
this bias by presenting the network with each item in the test set followed by the 
reflected version of that item (for example, one weight at a distance of five on the left 
and five weights at a distance of one on the right followed by five weights at a distance 
of one on the left and one weight at a distance of five on the right). This did help the 
problem to some extent, also creating a more pronounced inaccessible region in the 
pretest and posttest distributions, but was not enough to produce the degree of learning 
from pretest to posttest seen in the children.
4-Input Architecture
Another modification we experimented with was changing the architecture of the 
model to have only four, as opposed to twenty, input units. Instead of representing 
whether an individual weight is on the scale and whether a weight is at a particular 
distance with units for each piece of information that have activations of 0 or 1, we had 
four input units: one for weight on the left, one for weight on the right, one for distance 
on the left, and one for distance on the right (this was also done by Shultz,  Mareschal, & 
Schmidt, 1994). Each of these units had activations of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, or 1, depending                                                                                           Connectionist Model                   44
on whether there are 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 weights at 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 distances on each side. The
use of distinct units to represent different amounts of weight and distance was discussed 
by McClelland (1995) as a shortcoming of the model because it does not allow the 
network to extrapolate beyond or interpolate within the range of values that it has 
experienced. On the other hand, using this ordered representation of the distance and 
weight encodes the structure of each dimension inherently so that the network does not 
do the work of learning these relationships.
The 4-input architecture with training at test produced a remarkably pronounced 
inaccessible region in the pretest, posttest, and divergence test (much more pronounced 
than the data from Jansen & van der Maas, 2001). Often there were no scores of two 
occurring at all in the pretest and posttest, though there were always some scores of three. 
The types of transitions in behavior from pretest to posttest were still not matching the 
children’s behavior in these simulations. 
 We also tried to force generalizations about reflected items in this version of the 
architecture by directly slaving together weights that represent corresponding information 
for the two sides of the scale. This was done by constraining the weights to their average 
value after any learning occurred. This had a similar affect on the results as the reflected 
test set had, but still did not produce a close enough correspondence to the learning trends 
seen in children.                                                                                          Connectionist Model                   45
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